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RESOURCEWINDFALLS, POLITICAL REGIMES, AND POLITICAL STABILITY
Francesco Caselli and Andrea Tesei*
Abstract—We study theoretically and empirically whether natural resource
windfalls affect political regimes. We show that windfalls have no effect
on democracies, while they have heterogeneous political consequences in
autocracies. In deeply entrenched autocracies, the effect of windfalls is
virtually nil, while in moderately entrenched autocracies, windfalls signif-
icantly exacerbate the autocratic nature of the political system. To frame
the empirical work, we present a simple model in which political incum-
bents choose the degree of political contestability and potential challengers
decide whether to try to unseat the incumbents. The model uncovers a mech-
anism for the asymmetric impact of resource windfalls on democracies and
autocracies, as well as the the differential impact within autocracies.
I. Introduction
LOOKING at the historical experiences of specific coun-tries, it seems uncontroversial that an abundance of nat-
ural resources can shape political outcomes. Few observers
of Venezuela, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and many other
resource-rich countries would take seriously the propo-
sition that political developments in these countries can
be understood without reference—indeed without attribut-
ing a central role—to these countries’ natural wealth. Yet
the mechanisms through which natural resource abundance
affects politics frustrate attempts to identify simple gen-
eralizations, with resource-rich countries displaying great
variations in measures of autocracy and democracy, and
political stability. For example, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria
feature a strong tendency toward autocracy, but the former
is extraordinarily stable while the latter has experienced nine
successful coups since independence (and many unsuccess-
ful ones). Venezuela seems to go back and forth between
democracy and autocracy, with swings that closely follow
the price of oil, while Norway appears to be safely and stably
democratic regardless of the oil price.
In this paper, we use a large panel of countries and within-
country variation to document the following regularities.
Natural resource windfalls have no effect on the political
system when they occur in democracies. However, windfalls
have significant political consequences in autocracies. In par-
ticular, when an autocratic country receives a positive shock
to its flow of resource rents, it responds by becoming even
more autocratic. Importantly, there is heterogeneity in the
response of autocracies. In deeply entrenched autocracies,
the effect of windfalls on politics is virtually nil. It is only in
moderately entrenched autocracies that windfalls exacerbate
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the autocratic nature of the political system. Hence, our evi-
dence generalizes a casual observation: windfalls have little
or no impact in democracies (Norway) or very stable autoc-
racies (Saudi Arabia) but change the political equilibrium in
more unstable autocracies (Nigeria, Venezuela).
To reach these conclusions we measure natural resource
windfalls as changes in the price of a country’s principal
export commodity. We argue that such changes are plausi-
bly exogenous to changes in a country’s political system.
First, the identity of a country’s main export commodity
(e.g., oil versus gold) should be mostly driven by geography
and geology. Second, the vast majority of countries individ-
ually account for a relatively small share of world output in
their principal export commodity, so it is unlikely that polit-
ical changes there will have an important effect on prices.1
Also, since we include country fixed effects, our results can-
not be driven by underlying country-specific trends common
to changes in principal-commodity prices and changes in
political regimes.
Our main measure of political institutions is the vari-
able Polity2 from the Polity IV database. Crucially for
our analysis, this is a continuous measure that varies from
extreme autocracy (Polity2 = −10) to perfect democracy
(Polity2 = +10), so it allows us to condition the analysis
on inframarginal differences in the degree of autocracy or
democracy, as well as to capture the effects of windfalls on
inframarginal changes in autocracy or democracy. As this
variable captures the extent to which the political system
is open to competition, we sometimes refer to our mea-
sure of autocracy or democracy as a measure of political
contestability.
To get a better sense of the sort of episodes driving
our empirical analysis, consider the recent case of oil-rich
Kazakhstan. President Nursultan Nazarbayev has been in
office since the country became independent. He has gradu-
ally expanded his presidential powers by decree: only he
can initiate constitutional amendments, appoint and dis-
miss the government, dissolve parliament, call referendums,
and appoint administrative heads of regions and cities. This
expansion in his powers has coincided with a strong rise
in the international price of oil. In 2002 the president
promulgated a law that set stringent requirements for the
maintenance of legal status of a political party. As a conse-
quence, the number of legal parties dropped from nineteen in
2002 to eight in 2003. In the same year, the president impris-
oned two leaders of the main opposition party on charges
of corruption. As a result of these changes, Kazakhstan’s
Polity2 score dropped from −4 to −6 in 2002. In the three
1 In the empirical analysis, we address the issue of large producers with the
potential to influence world prices and find that our results are not affected
by these economies.
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preceding years, the average annual increase in the price of
oil had been 27%, leading to a doubling of the price over
the period. Another oil-related case that will be fresh in the
memory of many readers is Iran in 2009. With the price of
oil increasing on average by 22% per year during the previ-
ous three years, the presidential elections of that year were
considered fraudulent by the opposition, who rejected the
results and called for mass demonstrations. These demon-
strations were violently repressed by the regime. As a result,
Iran’s Polity2 score fell from −6 to −7.
Such examples are certainly not limited to oil. In El Sal-
vador the presidential elections of February 1977 took place
with the price of coffee increasing by an average 41% per
year in the previous three years. There was a clumsy and
poorly disguised electoral fraud in favor of the ruling conser-
vative party candidate, General Carlos Humberto Romero.
The opposition candidate, Colonel Ernesto Claramount, and
a crowd of thousands gathered in the Plaza Libertad in San
Salvador to protest Romero’s election. The rally was attacked
by government forces, leaving as many as fifty protesters
dead. In November, the grip of repression was strengthened
with the approval of the Law for the Defense and Guarantee
of Public Order, eliminating almost all legal restrictions on
violence against civilians. As a result El Salvador’s Polity2
score fell from −1 to −6.2
In order to motivate our empirical analysis and facilitate
the interpretation of the results, we open the paper with
a simple model of endogenous determination of political
contestability. In our model a governing elite has complete
control of the flow of income from natural resources and
decides whether and how much of it to invest in what we
call self-preservation activities. These range from the mild
(e.g., direct or indirect vote buying) to the extreme (violent
repression of the opposition). At the same time, a polit-
ical entrepreneur outside the ruling elite decides whether
to challenge those in power and try to replace them. This
simple game generates endogenously two possible political
modes: free and fair political competition (recognizable as
democracy), where the elite essentially allows challenges to
occur on a relatively level playing field, and the political
entrepreneur chooses to compete for power; and a “repres-
sion” mode where the elite invests some of the resources
deriving from natural resources in self-preservation activi-
ties, without, however, succeeding in completely deterring
challenges.
2 A very similar case is represented by Guatemala, whose principal com-
modity is also coffee. As in El Salvador, the role of the military in Guatemala
had been prominent since the early 1960s, with the support of the coffee
elite. The responses to social protests during the 1970s were similar to
those in El Salvador. The presidential elections of 1978 took place with
prices of coffee increasing on average by 60% per year in the previous
three years. The elections were fraudulent, and the ensuing revolutionary
movement was repressed by the harsh counterrevolutionary activity of the
government, backed by the military and the coffee oligarchy. This started
a period of violence and institutional chaos that ended only in 1985 with
the return to democracy. Guatemala’s Polity2 score fell from −3 to −5 in
1978.
The key determinant of the regime that is selected as an
equilibrium is the amount of revenue accruing to the gov-
ernment from natural resources. This enters the ruling elite’s
decision problem in two ways: it is part of the payoff from
staying in office, as political survival implies that the cur-
rent elite remains in control of future revenues, and it also
enters the budget constraint, as it is the principal source of
funding for self-preservation activities, such as vote buying
or political repression. At low levels of resource income, the
incentive to engage in self-preservation spending is relatively
low, as the future “pie” to hold on to is small. Democracy is
the outcome. At higher levels, the future benefits from hold-
ing on to power are sufficiently large that the government
shifts to autocracy. Crucially, the larger the pie, the more
the incumbent finds it optimal to spend on self-preservation,
so the degree of autocracy is increasing in the size of the
resource rents.
One prediction of the model is that political contestability
is nonlinearly related to resource abundance. Ceteris paribus,
resource-poor countries will be democratic, while resource-
rich ones will be autocratic, and the level of autocracy will
be increasing in the amount of resource rents. However,
for reasons we discuss later, this prediction is hard to test
in an econometrically compelling way. We therefore note
that another prediction of the model is that resource-poor
countries (which the model predicts to be democracies) will
not experience changes in political contestability following
(small) resource shocks, while resource-abundant countries
will. Furthermore, in the model, the rate of decline in polit-
ical contestability following changes in resource rents is
decreasing in the initial level of resource rents (and hence
in the initial level of autocracy). This is due to an assump-
tion of decreasing returns in self-preservation spending by
the incumbent government. Hence, the model also predicts
that in autocracies, the effect of windfalls is decreasing in
the extent to which the autocracy is entrenched. This pre-
dicted heterogeneity in response between democracies and
autocracies, as well as within autocracies, is the focus of our
empirical work.
The threshold levels of resource income that cause the
shift from one political regime to the other depend on param-
eters that may vary across countries. For example if the “ego
rents” from office are lower, the range of values of natu-
ral wealth for which the ruling elite accepts free and fair
challenges is (potentially much) wider than in places where
political power per se offers greater rewards. A similar effect
is produced if the “technology” for self-preservation is less
effective, which could be the case in countries with a cul-
ture less deferential to those in power, where the citizens are
willing to bear greater costs to challenge abuses or politi-
cal leaders cannot rely on preexisting structures of power
(e.g., ethnic allegiances) to leverage the resources conferred
by incumbency. In this way, the model can potentially also
explain cases such as Norway, where great natural resource
wealth is associated with democracy.
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The paper continues as follows. First, we briefly review
the relevant literature. Section II presents the model, and
section III presents data and results. Section IV concludes.
A. Related Literature
An important literature in political science studies the
relationship between resource abundance and democratic/
autocratic institutions using predominantly comparative
case studies or cross-country variation (Ross, 2001a, 2001b,
2009; Ulfelder, 2007; Collier & Hoeffler, 2009; Alex-
eev & Conrad, 2009; Tsui, 2011).3 While there is some
heterogeneity in the conclusions this literature tends to
reach, the evidence in these studies points to a negative
relationship between resource abundance and democracy/
democratization, consistent with both our model and the cir-
cumstantial cross-sectional evidence we present. However,
we argue that identification of causal effects can be achieved
with greater confidence using within-country variation, and
this is the basis for the core of our empirical evidence.
A recent literature, narrowly focused on windfalls from
oil, uses within-country evidence. Haber and Menaldo
(2011) and Wacziarg (2012) find no evidence that oil wind-
falls lead to greater autocracy. One concern with the Haber
and Menaldo (2011) study is that its measure of oil rev-
enue, partly based on oil production, is potentially endoge-
nous to democratic change, while a possible concern with
Wacziarg’s analysis is that it uses the world oil price for all
countries, meaning that there is no possibility to include time
effects to control for global trends. Brückner, Ciccone, and
Tesei (2012) find a positive coefficient on oil price shocks
interacted with the share of net oil exports in GDP in a
regression for movements toward democracy. They do not
condition on whether the country is initially a democracy or
an autocracy and do not examine heterogeneous responses
within autocracies.4
More broadly the paper contributes to a significant empir-
ical literature on the economic determinants of democracy/
autocracy. Many authors have investigated the causal rela-
tionship between income and democracy (Barro, 1999;
Epstein et al., 2006; Ulfelder & Lustik, 2007; Glaeser,
Ponzetto, & Shleifer, 2007; Acemoglu et al., 2008; Brückner
& Ciccone, 2010; Burke & Leigh, 2010). As discussed, we
focus not on generic income changes but more specifically on
windfalls associated with commodity price shocks. Because
natural resource booms typically translate into direct wind-
falls into the hands of political elites, these shocks may have
3 Tsui (2011) is perhaps closest to us among these, as he also looks at
the heterogeneous responses between democracies and autocracies. His
results are consistent with ours. Aside from relying on cross-sectional evi-
dence, however, his contribution focuses only on oil and does not explore
heterogeneity in responses within autocracies.
4 A possible interpretation of the result in Brückner et al. (2012) is that
since the oil share is highly correlated with autocracy, their oil-share/oil-
price interaction operates as a rough proxy for our autocracy/oil-price
interaction. The results are therefore consistent with ours, as in both
cases they imply a lesser movement toward autocracy in more entrenched
autocracies.
very different political consequences from other sources of
income shocks. In fact, the literature on the natural resource
curse casts doubt on the premise that resource windfalls
reach the general population (Sachs & Warner, 2001; Caselli
& Michaels, 2013). Burke and Leigh (2010) do use com-
modity price changes as instruments for income changes, so
their work is more closely related. They find insignificant
effects of commodity-driven income changes on political
regimes. Their focus, however, is on dichotomous variables
measuring the onset of large changes toward autocracy or
democracy. Instead, in keeping with the spirit of our model,
we study changes in autocracy/democracy as a continuous
variable. Furthermore, Burke and Leigh (2010) do not con-
dition the effect of commodity price changes on whether
the country was initially democratic or autocratic, much less
on inframarginal differences in the initial level of political
contestability. Finally, in Burke and Leigh (2010), the effect
of windfalls is mediated by their effect on income changes,
while we estimate the direct effect of the windfall. For the
reasons mentioned above, there may be reasons to prefer a
reduced-form specification.
Finally, several authors have looked at the effects of
resource windfalls on political economy outcomes other
than democracy/autocracy. For example, Leite and Weid-
mann (1999), Tavares (2003), Sala-i Martin and Subrama-
nian (2003), Dalgaard and Olsson (2008), and Caselli and
Michaels (2013) present corresponding empirical evidence
on resource abundance and corruption. Besley and Persson
(2011), Lei and Michaels (2014), Cotet and Tsui (2013),
and Dube and Vargas (2013), among others, have looked
at resource windfalls and civil war and political violence;
Deaton and Miller (1995) and Andersen and Aslaksen (2013)
at incumbents’ survival; Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin (2009)
at media repression by autocrats; and Caselli, Morelli, and
Rohner (2013) at international war.
Theoretically, our model is illustrative of a class of contri-
butions that have examined the effect of resource windfalls
on rulers and elites’ decisions on the amount of political
contenstability they choose to allow (Acemoglu, Verdier, &
Robinson, 2004; Caselli, 2006; Dunning, 2008; Caselli &
Cunningham, 2009; Tsui, 2010; Besley & Persson, 2011).
Resource windfalls may increase repression by relaxing the
ruler’s budget constraint (particularly emphasized by Ace-
moglu et al., 2004)5 in response to increased challenges by
outsiders (Tsui, 2010), or because they increase the value
of staying in power for the incumbent (this paper).6 Many
of these studies (particularly those by Caselli, 2006, and
Tsui, 2010) derive nonmonotonicities analogous to the one
in this paper, and for similar reasons. More generally, the
model belongs to a class of work on conditional resource
5 Haggard and Kaufman (1997) and Geddes (1999) also stress the role of
the budget constraint of political incumbents.
6 In Dunning (2008), however, windfalls may reduce suppression of
contestability as they reduce the amount of redistribution that would be
implemented under democracy.
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curses—where the effects of resource windfalls can be ben-
eficial or adverse according to the size of the windfall or the
values of certain conditioning variables (Tornell & Lane,
1998; Baland & François, 2000; Torvik, 2002; Cabrales &
Hauk, 2011; Besley & Persson, 2011; Caselli & Coleman,
2013).
II. Natural Resources and Political Outcomes
A. Model
The setting is a discrete-time infinite-horizon economy
that generates, in every period, a constant flow of consump-
tion goods A from the exploitation of natural resources.
Interpretations of A include the flow of royalties and other
fees paid to the government by international extracting com-
panies for the right to operate in the country; profits of
state-owned corporations engaged in drilling and mining;
rents generated by the international distribution of domestic
cash crops by state-controlled marketing boards; or other
rents linked to cash crops exports due to discrepancies
between official and market exchange rates. We will refer
to A as resource rents.7
The economy is populated by an infinite number of infin-
itely lived agents (which can also be intepreted as political
dynasties or interest groups). In every period, one agent
begins the period as the incumbent. One should think of the
incumbent as the individual, or group of individuals, with de
facto control of the government. In a democracy this would
be the president and his or her collaborators (in presidential
systems) or the leadership of the governing parties (in parlia-
mentary systems). In autocracies this would be the autocrat,
his or her family, and close associates.
The sequence of events and actions within each period
is the following. First, the incumbent allocates the period
rents A between self-preservation spending, Bt and consump-
tion, Ct . Next, nature picks at random another agent (not the
incumbent) to be the “potential challenger.” The potential
challenger then decides whether to stage a challenge to the
incumbent. If yes, the challenge succeeds with probability
p(Bt). If the challenge succeeds, the challenger begins the
next period as the new incumbent. If the challenge fails,
the incumbent begins the next period as incumbent. If the
potential challenger does not challenge, the incumbent also
continues as incumbent. Time is discounted by all agents at
rate β.
In a democracy, the potential challenger could be inter-
preted as the person with the best chance to win an electoral
context against the incumbent president or party. In an autoc-
racy, it could be the agent best placed to successfully lead
a coup or a popular uprising against the ruling clique. The
7 We abstract from other sources of government revenues, as none of our
comparative static results would be affected by their explicit inclusion.
Nor are we able to make progress on the important question of whether or
why resource windfalls have different political effects from other types of
government revenues.
assumption that in every period there is only one potential
challenger is not important for the results but simplifies the
analysis. For simplicity of presentation and again without
loss of generality, we also assume that potential challengers
are drawn without replacement (i.e., each agent gets at most
one chance to challenge) and that deposed incumbents never
get a chance to challenge subsequent incumbents.
Period payoffs for the incumbent are Ct + Θ. One inter-
pretation of Ct is resources appropriated by the incumbent
and his or her clique for personal enrichment—the infa-
mous “Swiss bank accounts.” But in general, Ct could be
interpreted as an aggregate of all the spending that pro-
vides satisfaction to the incumbent and hence, possibly, it
could include public spending on, for example, schools or
hospitals, if the incumbent is partially altruistic or derives
satisfaction from doing “a good job.” An incumbent also
receives a flow of ego rents, Θ. Assuming that there are
additional benefits (both psychological and material) from
holding political power is realistic and indeed standard in
the literature (Rogoff, 1990; Osborne & Slivinski, 1996).
Period payoffs for the individual selected as the potential
challenger are normalized to 0 if he or she challenges and to
Π if he does not challenge. Π represents the present value
of income from his or her activities outside politics. We also
normalize to 0 the continuation payoff of a challenger if he
or she chooses to challenge and the challenge fails, as well as
the continuation payoff of an incumbent who is successfully
challenged.8
The probability that a challenge will succeed is decreasing
in self-preservation spending, or p′(Bt) < 0. Our interpre-
tation of self-preservation spending is as a catch-all for all
activities the government engages in in order to subvert the
outcome of the political selection process in his or her favor.
Anecdotically, it appears that the first steps toward autoc-
racy are relatively mild: “beginner autocrats” engage in some
patronage, some vote buying, some corruption of journalists
and media outlets. More established ones add some physical
or judicial intimidation, and perhaps electoral irregularities.
Yet more aggressive autocrats further include disappear-
ances and show trials. Finally, the most entrenched call off
elections, prohibit political parties, and repress violently all
sorts of opposition. If this description is correct, then the
overall budget devoted to these activities seems likely to rise
as further tools are deployed by the autocrat. At the same
time, the likelihood of a successful challenge declines. This
is why we assume that p is decreasing in B.
Hence, B captures inframarginal variation in the efforts
exerted by those currently in power to subvert the rules of
the game in their favor, with greater values of B being asso-
ciated with greater autocracy. By the same token, we think
of B = 0 as the situation where the incumbent accepts to
be challenged on a “free and fair” basis. In sum, we inter-
pret countries with B = 0 as democracy and countries with
8 These normalizations could be relaxed as long as both the incumbent
and the challenger prefer winning rather than losing in case of a challenge.
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B > 0 as displaying varying levels of autocracy. Since B
also affects a potential challenger’s chances of taking over,
we will also refer to B as a measure of political contestability.
In order to obtain crisp results, we need to pick a functional
form for p(B). We use
p(B) = Ωe−δB,
where Ω ∈ (0, 1) and δ > 0 are exogenous parameters.
Hence, self-preservation spending is subject to decreasing
returns, with p(0) = Ω—implying that a challenger can
never be absolutely certain of success—and p(B) > 0 for all
B—implying that an autocrat can never be absolutely sure
of successfully withstanding a challenge. These features are
important but seem sensible.
The most restrictive assumption of the model is that the
components of Ct do not affect p or Π. If the public is less
tolerant of corrupt politicians, then we might expect the com-
ponents of Ct that represent self-enrichment to enter p posi-
tively. If the public rewards competent politicians, we should
expect the components of Ct that represent public spending
to enter p negatively, in the tradition of Barro (1973). In
addition, public spending in infrastructure, human capital,
and other growth-promoting public goods could improve the
outside option of potential challengers by improving oppor-
tunities in the private economy (or increasing the cost of
recruiting supporters). Hence, these components of Ct could
increase Π. We abstract from these issues in order to get
simple results, but see Caselli and Cunningham (2009) and
Tsui (2010) for a detailed discussion.9
B. Analysis
We formally analyze the model in the online appendix.
Here we offer a heuristic discussion and explain the key
results.
We focus on Markov perfect equilibria (MPE), of which
we show there is only one. Given that the only state variable
is the resource rent A and this is constant over time, it is
immediate that players will follow stationary strategies: the
incumbent will set the same value of B in every period, while
the potential challenger will either always challenge or never
challenge.
9 A straightforward extension in the direction of allowing productive
public spending would be as follows. Rents are allocated between repres-
sion, B, private consumption, C, and productive public spending, G, and
the probability of successful challenge is decreasing in both B and G:
p(B) = Ωe−δB−γG. In this case, the incumbent never uses both tools at
the same time. In particular, if δ > γ, the incumbent uses only repression,
while if δ < γ, he or she uses only productive public spending. Hence, one
interpretation of the model is that we focus on the case δ > γ. Another inter-
pretation is that the relative magnitudes of γ and δ vary across countries,
perhaps for cultural, geographic, or geostrategic reasons. In countries where
δ > γ, the analysis in the rest of this section applies. Countries with γ > δ
will obviously be democracies, as we defined democracy as a country with
B = 0. Furthermore, in such countries, shocks to natural resource rents will
have no impact on B. Hence, we recover the same empirical prediction as in
the baseline model: we should observe no systematic response of political
institutions to resource shocks in democracies.
We begin by establishing the conditions for equilibria
where the challenger always challenges. In such an equi-
librium, the value of being an incumbent at the beginning of
any period is
V(A, B′) = Θ+ A − B
′
1 − β [1 − p(B′)] ,
where B′ is the equilibrium level of self-preservation spend-
ing. In every period, the incumbent receives ego rents Θ and
consumes resource rents net of self-preservation spending
A − B. This flow utility is appropriately discounted by tak-
ing into account time preferences β and the fact that in each
period the probability of political death is p(B′).
One condition for an equilibrium with challenges is that
the level of self-preservation spending must be feasibly opti-
mal from the point of view of the current incumbent. The
current incumbent’s problem is
maxB
{
Θ+ A − B + β [1 − p(B)]V(A, B′)}
s.t. B ≥ 0
B ≤ A.
In choosing B, the incumbent trades off the short-term
decline in consumption with the improved probability of
surviving until the next period and enjoying the continu-
ation value of office. The feasibility constraints say that
self-preservation spending cannot be negative and cannot
exceed the resources available to the incumbent.10
Now define b(A, B′) as the solution to the above problem.
In an equilibrium, b(A, B′) must be a fixed point, or
b(A, B′) = B′.
In the online appendix we show that this fixed-point problem
has a unique solution. In particular, there exists a value of
A, A0 (to be characterized shortly), such that the solution is
at the corner B′ = 0 for A ≤ A0, while for A > A0, B′ is the
interior solution to the problem above. We call this interior
solution B∗(A). B∗(A) is increasing and concave and satisfies
B∗(A0) = 0. The intuition for this result is simple and can be
illustrated with reference to the incumbent’s problem above.
The marginal cost of extra preservation spending is constant
and equal to 1. The marginal return is −p′(B)βV(A, B′)—the
improvement in survival probabilities times the value of sur-
viving. Since the value of surviving is increasing in A, there
10 The mechanism highlighted in the model will continue to work even
if the government can tap into foreign financial markets to finance self-
preservation spending. Foreign borrowing may somewhat reduce the oppor-
tunity cost of preservation spending by shifting it to the future, creating a bias
toward greater autocracy. Autocrats (like most countries) are likely to face
increasing, and indeed convex, supply curves for foreign funds, so the mar-
ginal opportunity cost of self-preservation spending will also be increasing
and convex. The combination of an increasing and convex marginal oppor-
tunity cost of funds with decreasing returns in the self-preservation activity
will generate the same concave relation (beyond A0) between resource
endowments and self-preservation spending as in the model with a balanced
budget.
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can be sufficiently low values of A such that the incumbent
renounces all self-preservation efforts. On the other hand,
if A is sufficiently large, the incumbent spends (increasing)
amounts on self-preservation. The equilibrium amount of
self-preservation is the one that equalizes marginal cost and
marginal benefit.11
The threshold value A0 is given by
A0 = 1 − β(1 −Ω) − βΩδΘ
βΩδ
and is therefore decreasing in the “ego rents” from hold-
ing office. Intuitively, the larger the ego rents are, the lower
the level of resource rents required to make the incumbent
feel that incumbency is valuable enough to invest resources
in protecting it. The technology of political replacement
also affects A0. In particular, a higher productivity of self-
preservation spending, δ, makes the incumbent more willing
to exert efforts in this direction, lowering the threshold for
autocratic behavior.
We think of B = 0 as akin to the idea of free and fair
political competition, and hence as democracy. Since democ-
racy is the observed equilibrium outcome in many countries,
we assume that there exists a region of the parameter space
where it occurs. Formally,
Parametric Assumption 1 (PA1): A0 > 0.
A second condition for an equilibrium where the chal-
lenger challenges is that challenging is optimal given the
level of self-preservation efforts exerted by the incumbent.
If the equilibrium incumbent strategy is B, the challenger
decides to challenge if
p(B)βV(A, B) > Π. (1)
The left-hand side is the expected utility of challenging. This
is equal to the time-discounted value of beginning the next
period as the incumbent times the probability that the chal-
lenge will succeed. The right-hand side is the (certain) utility
from not challenging—the outside option Π.12
Since the value of holding office is increasing in A, con-
dition (1) is satisfied for any A if it is satisfied for A = 0.
In turn, the condition is satisfied for A = 0 if the following
parametric assumption holds.13
11 We show in the online appendix that the other constraint, B ≤ A, is
never binding.
12 Note that Π depends on β. In particular, if π is the flow utility in the
private sector, then Π = π/(1 − β).
13 To see that PA1 and PA2 are mutually consistent, notice that PA1 can
be rewritten as
βΩΘ
1 − β(1 −Ω) <
1
δ
.
Parametric Assumption 2 (PA2): Π < βΩΘ1−β(1−Ω) .
Note that for A = 0, the incumbent chooses democracy.
If PA2 did not hold, incumbents would face no challenges
in democracies. This would be counterfactual, so PA2 seems
like a plausible assumption. The simple interpretation of PA2
is that the ego rents from office are sufficiently attractive
relative to private life to make potential challengers willing
to try their luck at politics (when there are no resource rents
and the country is a democracy).
A final requirement for an equilibrium where the chal-
lenger challenges is that the incumbent does not try to
completely deter a challenge in the current period. The devi-
ation that does so is the one that satisfies equation (1) with
equality.14 Call ˜Bc(A) such a deviation. We show that there
exists a level of A, ˜A, such that ˜Bc(A) > A for all A < ˜A.
This says that resource-poor incumbents cannot afford the
level of preservation spending that would be required to com-
pletely deter challenges. Only when A is sufficiently large
can an incumbent entirely deter challenges. The value of ˜A
is given by
˜A = 1
δ
log
βΩΘ
Π(1 − β) .
This is increasing in the ego rents. Larger ego rents mean that
potential challengers are less easily deterred: the required
investments in self-preservation are larger and therefore
unaffordable for a broader range of values of A. Similarly, ˜A
is decreasing in the opportunity cost of challenging and in
the productivity of spending.
For values of A ≥ ˜A, deviating to a strategy of complete
deterrence is feasible, and the question is whether the devi-
ation is preferred. It turns out that this depends on whether
log(δΠ) + 1 ≥ 0, in which case the deviation is preferred,
or log(δΠ) + 1 < 0, in which case the incumbent sticks to
the “interior” (nondeterring) amount of preservation spend-
ing. The intuition is that both δ and Π reduce the cost
of full deterrence, the former by increasing the productiv-
ity of preservation spending and the latter by making the
challenger more easily convinced thanks to a better outside
option.
We assume that even when a deviation is feasible, the
incumbent will not deviate from the interior strategy.15
Formally,
Parametric Assumption 3 (PA3): log(δΠ) + 1 < 0.
14 We implicitly assume that the incumbent does not challenge when
indifferent.
15 If we were to replace PA3 with its opposite and assumed A0 ≤ ˜A, then
we would have three types of political regimes: democracies (B = 0 for
A ≤ A0); unstable autocracies (B = B∗ for A0 < A ≤ ˜A); and stable
autocracies (B = ˜B for ˜A < A), defined as autocracies that choose to
completely deter any challenge. The empirical predictions would be quite
similar.
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Figure 1.—Theoretical Relation between Resource Revenues
and Autocracy
This leads to the following summary of the discussion
so far.
Lemma 1. Under PA2 and PA3, an MPE where the chal-
lenger challenges exists for all A. If A ≤ A0, then B = 0
(democracy). If A > A0, then B = B∗(A) (autocracy).
We can now turn to the conditions for an MPE where the
challenger is deterred. In this equilibrium, the incumbent
invests an amount ˜B(A) that solves
p( ˜B)β ˜V(A, ˜B) = Π,
where ˜V(A, ˜B) is now the value of incumbency when the
challenger does not challenge. ˜B(A) is increasing and con-
cave. By definition of ˜B(A), the challenger is deterred. Not
surprisingly it turns out that the policy is feasible if A ≥ ˜A,
but it is preferred by the current incumbent to a one-period
deviation to the optimal interior level of B if PA3 holds.
Hence, we have the following result:
Lemma 2. Under PA3, there is no MPE where the chal-
lenger is deterred.
Note that lemmas 1 and 2 imply that the MPE is unique.
This gives rise to the following conclusion: In the unique
MPE equilibrium, resource poor-countries are democracies,
while resource-rich countries are autocracies. In autocra-
cies, spending on self-preservation is an increasing and
concave function of the resource rents.
This result says that for values of the resource rent that
are sufficiently small, the value of staying in office is limited
and does not justify spending on self-preservation. Hence,
resource poor countries will tend to be democratic. For
higher values of resource rents, the incumbent finds it opti-
mal to exert efforts to remain in power and does so up the
point where the extra improvement in the expected value of
staying in office is equal to the marginal cost of resources
spent on self-preservation. Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium
amount of self-preservation spending as a function of A.
Note that the threshold A0 depends on parameters that are
potentially country varying. For example, a decline in the
effectiveness of self-preservation spending δ or in the ego
rents Θ shifts the autocracy threshold A0 to the right. In
other words, countries with greater cultural, geographical,
historical, or external resistance to autocracy—all features
that should map into a lower value of δ—or countries where
the same factors dictate that the balance between the privi-
leges and the responsibilities of political power weighs the
latter more (low Θ), will remain in democratic mode for a
wider range of values of A. This way, the model can perhaps
be seen as consistent with cases of high A associated with
free and fair democracy, such as Norway.16
C. Testable Implications
To get us closer to our empirics, we now consider the
following thought experiment. Suppose that at some date,
the value of A unexpectedly increases by a (small) amount
dA, and all agents expect it to remain constant at this value
for the indefinite future (this is all consistent with rational
expectations if A is believed to be a random walk). Then we
obviously have
dB = 0 for A ≤ A0,
dB = B∗′ for A0 < A.
Hence, in resource-poor countries, marginal increases in
resource rents lead to no political change. However, in coun-
tries with nonnegligible resource rents, further windfalls
induce an increase in self-preservation spending. In partic-
ular, for intermediate values of the rent flow, the incumbent
becomes keener to stay in office and hence increases his
efforts in this direction. For even larger initial levels of
the resource flow, the incumbent finds that the required
amount of spending needed to deter challengers goes up and
must correspondingly increase it. Because B∗ is a concave
function of A, the response of self-preservation spending is
decreasing in the resource flow over this range.
Combining the two sets of results on the level of B and
the change of B as functions of the initial level of A, it is
also possible to recast the latter set of results as conditioned
on the initial level of democracy or autocracy. In particu-
lar, as we have noted, for low levels of A, countries tend to
be democratic. This implies that in democracies, marginal
changes in the flow of resource rents have no effect on the
political equilibrium. For larger values of the resource rent,
countries are autocracies. Hence, we find that in autocracies,
marginal changes in the flow of resource rents make the polit-
ical equilibrium more autocratic. Furthermore, the degree of
16 The uniqueness of the MPE is, of course, in part a feature of some of our
simplifying assumptions. For example, if we allowed a former incumbent
to enjoy the flow payoff of private citizens and made the value of being
a private citizen depend on the amount of repression experienced, it is
conceivable that we would have multiple MPEs. In particular, if future
governments repress a lot, the value of being a citizen goes down, so current
incumbents want to hold on more tightly.
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tightening of the autocratic screws is variable. Clearly the
concavity of B∗ with respect to the initial level of A also
carries through to the relationship between the change and
the initial level of B. Hence, in autocracies, the increase
in autocracy following an increase in resource revenues is
diminishing in the initial level of autocracy. For reasons we
discuss below, the core empirical work in the paper is based
on the predictions of this paragraph.
III. Evidence
A. General Strategy
The main result of the model is a highly nonlinear rela-
tionship between resource income A and self-preservation
efforts B, as depicted in figure 1. In principle, there are three
possible approaches to try to identify this relationship empir-
ically. We discuss the three approaches and explain why only
one, which we discuss last, is likely to generate compelling
evidence. In discussing the three approaches, we assume we
have good measures of A and B. In the next section, we
discuss the data in detail.
Given a measure of B, the first plan that comes to mind
(plan 1) is to try to get a measure of A and then use nonlinear
methods to directly estimate the function in figure 1 using
cross-country data in levels. There are at least two problems
with this approach. First is the well-rehearsed vulnerability
of cross-country relationships to omitted variable bias. There
may be plenty of hard-to-account-for factors correlated with
both the volume of resource rents and the political system.
Second, as discussed at the end of the previous section,
the autocracy threshold A0 is likely to be country specific.
Appropriate identification would therefore require explicitly
modeling the dependence of A0 on hard-to-measure country-
specific factors. The results would likely be fairly opaque and
inconclusive.
Plan 2 investigates the relationship between A and B
within countries or, equivalently, in differences, condition-
ing on the initial level of A. Looking at the effects of changes
in A on changes in B eliminates time-invariant confounding
country-specific factors that bias inference in levels. Coun-
try fixed effects can be added to control for country-specific
trends in democracy and autocracy, and time effects can be
added to control for global trends. Hence, plan 2 largely
sidesteps the first of the identification issues affecting plan
1. However, because it conditions on the initial level of A,
plan 2 still requires an estimate of country-specific autocracy
thresholds A0, so it is still unsatisfactory.
Plan 3, like plan 2, estimates the relationship in differ-
ences, but instead of conditioning on the initial level of A,
it conditions on the initial level of B. Our theoretical results
say that countries to the left of the autocracy threshold are
democracies, so we can infer that if a country is a democ-
racy, it is to the left of its A0. We therefore expect no effect
of changes in A on changes in B in democracies. We also
know from the model that countries to the right of A0 are
autocracies, and the further to the right they are, the more
autocratic they are. Hence, we can infer that autocracies are
to the right of A0, and the more autocratic they are, the fur-
ther to the right they are. We therefore expect that the effect
of changes in A on changes in B is positive in autocracies,
the less so the more autocratic the initial position. This plan
largely sidesteps both the problem of omitted factors in levels
and the country specificity of the autocracy threshold.
B. Data
We construct a measure for B from the variable Polity2
in the Polity IV database (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2002).
Polity2 is widely used in the empirical political science lit-
erature as a measure of the position of a country on a contin-
uum autocracy-democracy spectrum (Acemoglu et al., 2008;
Persson & Tabellini, 2006, 2009; Besley & Kudamatsu,
2006; Brückner & Ciccone, 2011). It aggregates information
on several building blocks, including political participation
(existence of institutions through which citizens can express
preferences over policies and leaders), constraints on the
executive, and guarantees of civil liberties in both daily life
and political participation, as evaluated by Polity IV coders.
Polity2 varies continuously from −10 (extreme autocracy)
to +10 (perfect democracy).17 Note, therefore, that Polity2
is an inverse measure of B. We follow the convention in the
vast majority of the literature that interprets negative values
of Polity2 as pertaining to autocracies and positive ones to
democracies (Persson & Tabellini, 2006, 2009; Brückner &
Ciccone, 2011; Jones & Olken, 2009; Epstein et al., 2006).18
To map the Polity2 score into a proxy for B we make the
following assumption:
Polity2it = α− f (Bit) + εit , (2)
where Bit is our variable of interest, f is a monotonic function
with f (0) = 0, α > 0 is a constant, and εit is an i.i.d. error
with zero mean. These assumptions imply that when the gov-
ernment does not attempt to subvert in its favor the political
process (B = 0), the Polity2 measure tends to be positive and
its variation to depend on factors we do not model. Instead,
when the government takes an autocratic stance, the Polity2
variable is decreasing in the aggressiveness of this stance.
As long as f (B) is not (too) convex, equation (2) implies
that the Polity2 score will inherit the same properties of B in
the model. In particular, for values of the Polity2 score asso-
ciated with democracies (Polity2 > 0, or B = 0), changes
in A have no systematic effect on changes in Polity2 score.
In autocracies (negative Polity2, or positive B), increases in
17 We adjust Polity2 by assigning missing values to cases of interregnum
and anarchy, which are instead coded as 0 in the original data. The online
appendix investigates the robustness of our results to further adjustments.
18 In the online appendix we discuss alternative thresholds. There, we also
present an exercise that attempts to identify the location of the kink in the
relationship between changes in B and our measure of resource windfalls.
The results are very consistent with a location at (or near) Polity2 = 0.
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Table 1.—Countries by Commodity
Princ. Number of
Comm. Countries Country Name
Oil 30 Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, China, Norway, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon,
Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Trinindad, Tunisia, UAE, United Kingdom, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Yemen
Coffee 11 Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Madagascar, Nicaragua,
Rwanda, Uganda
Wood 9 Austria, Canada, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Sweden
Pig iron 8 Albania, Bhutan, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Japan, Lebanon, Slovakia, Ukraine
Gemstones 7 Armenia, Botswana, Central African Republic, India, Lesotho, Namibia, Sierra Leone
Aluminum 6 Bahrain, Germany, Ghana, Mozambique, Slovenia, Switzerland
Oranges 6 Cyprus, Israel, Italy, Moldova, Spain, Turkey
Cotton 5 Benin, Burkina Faso, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Sudan
Bananas 4 Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, Philippines
Beef 4 Djibouti, Ireland, New Zealand, Uruguay
Copper 4 Chile, Mongolia, Peru, Zambia
Fish 4 Bangladesh, South Korea, Malta, Tanzania
Phosphates 4 Jordan, Morocco, Senegal, Togo
Coal 3 Australia, Czech Republic, Poland
Tobacco 3 Greece, Malawi, Zimbabwe
Bauxite 2 Guinea, Jamaica
Natural gas 2 Belgium, Turkmenistan
Rice 2 Pakistan, Thailand
Swine 2 Denmark, The Netherlands
Tea 2 Kenya, Sri Lanka
Wheat 2 Argentina, France
Cocoa 1 Côte d’Ivoire
Gold 1 Papua New Guinea
Groundnuts 1 Gambia
Jute 1 Nepal
Maize 1 United States
Rubber 1 Cambodia
Silver 1 South Africa
Soybean 1 Paraguay
Sugar 1 Eritrea
Tin 1 Bolivia
Uranium 1 Niger
A have negative but decreasing effects on changes in the
Polity2 score.
To measure natural resource windfalls at the country level,
we proceed as follows. First, for each country and for each
year that data are available, we rank all commodities (in
the universe of agricultural and mineral commodities) by
value of exports. We then identify each country’s princi-
pal commodity as the commodity that is ranked first in the
largest number of years. The export data by commodity,
country, and year are from the United Nations’ Comtrade
data set, which reports dollar values of exports according to
the SITC1 system, for the period 1962 to 2009. Finally, we
match each country’s principal commodity with an annual
time series of that commodity’s world price. All commod-
ity prices are extracted from the IMF IFS data set, with the
exception of gemstones, pig iron, and bauxite, whose price
series are obtained from the United States Geological Survey.
We identify a change in A in country i as a change in
the price of country i’s principal commodity. As both the
identity of a country’s principal commodity and its price
in international markets are largely exogenous to the coun-
try’s political outcomes, we think this measure allows clean
identification of the causal effects of resource windfalls
(we investigate robustness to dropping the largest producers
below).19
We study changes over the period 1962 to 2009. Our base-
line sample consists of 131 countries with information on
both principal commodity export shares and Polity2 scores.
There are 32 distinct principal commodities in this sample.
The most frequent are oil, the principal commodity in 30
countries, and coffee (11 countries). Table 1 gives the list
of these principal commodities and their distribution among
countries. In the online appendix, we present some illustra-
tive graphs of the time series relationship between lagged
price changes and changes in political regime for selected
countries.
Summary statistics are presented in table 2. ΔPolity2 is
the one-year difference in Polity2, while ΔPr is the average
19 It would be desirable to check the robustness of our results to nonexport-
based methods to identify principal commodities, such as total production
or endowments. Unfortunately commodity production and endowment data
are not readily available for a large number of countries. We have made
an attempt to identify a principal commodity using total output data from
the UN Industry Commodity Production Statistics (ICPS), but despite its
name, this data set mainly focuses on manufactured goods and does not
include many key commodities, such as coffee (our second most represented
principal commodity), cotton, tea, and tobacco.
582 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Table 2.—Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum N
ΔPolity2 0.096 1.724 −18 16 5,380
Polity2 0.983 7.538 −10 10 5,572
Polity2 1962 −0.118 7.641 −10 10 93
Polity2 2009 4.145 6.09 −10 10 131
ΔPr 0.078 0.185 −0.366 1.044 5,491
Share 0.058 0.097 0 1 4,048
Country Avg. Share 0.068 0.093 0.001 0.41 6,288
Years Princ. Comm. 22.124 11.851 2 48 6,288
Total years 30.901 15.054 2 48 6,288
growth rate in the price of the principal commodity over a
three-year window (we discuss timing issues below). Coun-
try Avg. Share is the average over time of the value of exports
of a country’s principal commodity as a share in GDP. Years
Princ. Comm. indicates the number of years the principal
commodity has been the principal export, and Total Years
is the total number of years in which commodity shares are
available. Some of the notable features in the data are the
huge variation in the Polity2 score and the secular trend
toward greater democracy. The table also shows that princi-
pal commodities are ranked first in almost all years in which
resource shares are available. Finally, the table shows that
there is much variation in the measure of resource windfalls.
A further breakdown of the data, reported in the
online Appendix, reveals substantial variation in both the
commodity-windfall variable and the political change vari-
able in all decades of the sample period. Hence, our results
are not driven by individual eras of particularly volatile
commodity prices or political upheaval.
In our model, regime change is triggered by changes in
resource rents that are perceived to be permanent. We proxy
these changes with changes (over three years) in the com-
modity spot price. A natural question is whether changes in
the spot price are sufficiently persistent to justify using them
as proxies for long-run changes in resource income. In the
online appendix, we present a variety of tests of stationarity/
nonstationarity of our commodity price series. With very
few exceptions and across three different testing strategies,
we cannot reject (reject) the hypotheses that our commodity
price series have unit roots (are stationary).20
20 An alternative strategy to capture changes in expected rents from com-
modities may be to focus on changes in futures prices. Unfortunately,
historical data on futures prices are relatively hard to come by, perhaps
because these markets are less liquid and established than most economists
tend to assume. The most comprehensive source we were able to identify,
for example, features futures prices for only 17 of the 32 principal com-
modities in our sample. Furthermore, it turns out that contracts exist only
for delivery at future dates only relatively close to the present. In particular,
for no commodity but oil could we find future prices with a delivery date
further than one year in the future. Even for oil, the time series for con-
tracts with a delivery date later than one year suggest that these markets are
very illiquid, inducing us to focus on the one-year contract in this case as
well. Finally, for most commodities, the sample period for which data are
available is significantly shorter than for the spot prices. As we show in the
online appendix, despite the much smaller sample size, results using futures
prices are entirely in line with those using sport prices. This result is less
remarkable than it may seem as the correlation between spot and futures
prices is very high.
Table 3.—Commodity Price Shocks and Institutional Change,
Baseline Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LS LS LS SYS-GMM
ΔPr −0.25
(0.17)
ΔPra −0.33∗ −0.42∗∗ −0.43∗
(0.18) (0.19) (0.26)
ΔPrd 0.12 0.13 0.09
(0.19) (0.18) (0.24)
ΔPra × Plt−4,a −0.14∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07)
ΔPrd × Plt−4,d 0.04 −0.07
(0.06) (0.08)
Plt−4,a −0.06∗∗∗ −0.04
(0.02) (0.04)
Plt−4,d −0.12∗∗∗ −0.11
(0.03) (0.07)
Demt−4 −1.04∗∗∗ −1.35∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.14) (0.31)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) [0.000]
AR(2) [0.684]
Number of countries 131 131 131 131
Observations 4,875 4,745 4,745 4,745
Significantly different from 0 at *90%, **95%, ***99%. The dependent variable is the t − 1 to t change
in the revised Polity score (Polity2). ΔPr is the average three-year change in the price of the principal
commodity.ΔPra is the average three-year change in the price of the principal commodity, multiplied by a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is autocratic at t −4. Plt−4,a is the country’s Polity2 score at t −4,
minus the average score among autocracies at t − 4. ΔPrd and Plt−4,d are the corresponding definitions
for democracies. Demt−4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is democratic at t − 4. The method
of estimation in columns 1 to 3 is least squares and in column 4, system-GMM (Blundell-Bond). Standard
errors in parentheses are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. The values reported for AR(1)
and AR(2) are the p-values for first- and second-order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences
equations.
C. Results
Our main empirical results are presented in table 3. The
dependent variable is the one-year change in Polity2. Recall
that an increase in this variable means that the country
becomes less autocratic (more democratic). In column 1,
the explanatory variable is the lagged change in the price of
the principal commodity, averaged over the previous three
years. Hence, if the change in Polity2 is measured between
years t − 1 and t, the change in commodity prices is the
average over the years t − 4, t − 3, t − 2, and t − 1. We
look at lagged changes in prices to defuse lingering con-
cerns about reverse causation, as well as to allow possible
lags in the reaction of political actors to economic events. We
take averages of price changes over three periods to reduce
the role of extremely transitory shocks, as well as measure-
ment error in the explanatory variable.21 By construction,
however, the rolling windows introduce serial correlation in
the estimates. To account for this, we cluster the standard
errors at the country level in all regressions, allowing for
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation in the error term.
Crucially, country and time fixed effects are included here
and in all subsequent specifications.
Column 1 reports estimates for the average effect of
resource windfalls, which is negative but not statistically
21 This is also the approach followed by Brückner and Ciccone (2010) and
discussed in Deaton (1999).
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significant. Recall that in our theory, the average effect is
a weighted average of nil effects in democracies and nega-
tive effects in autocracies, and thus depends on the relative
frequency of autocratic and democratic observations. In our
sample, the number of democracies exceeds the number of
autocracies (2,570 versus 2,305 observations). It is there-
fore not surprising that the overall effect is not statistically
significant.
In the remaining columns, we test our more detailed pre-
dictions. Column 2 looks at the effect of price changes
in democracies and autocracies separately. This is accom-
plished by separating out the price change variables into
two variables: an interaction between the price change and
a dummy for autocracy (following the literature conven-
tion that identifies autocracies as countries with a negative
Polity2 score) and an interaction between price change and a
dummy for democracy (nonnegative Polity2).22 The democ-
racy dummy is also included separately in the model. To be
consistent with the starting date for the price shock implied
by our lagging choices, we measure the initial level of autoc-
racy or democracy with a four-year lag, or in year t − 4.
As predicted by the model, price changes in the principal
commodity have a negative impact on the Polity2 score in
autocracies (i.e., make autocracies more autocratic). Instead,
they have no significant impact on the Polity2 score in
democracies.
A more specific prediction of our model is that in democ-
racies, commodity price changes will have no impact for
any initial level of Polity2, while in autocracies, the mag-
nitude of the effect should be increasing in contestability:
small in very aggressive autocracies and larger as the autoc-
racy takes milder forms. We test this prediction in column 3,
where we add four-year lags of Polity2 both by themselves
and interacted with the (autocracy/democracy specific) price
change, the latter being the variable of interest.23 The con-
ditioning variable has been entered with a lag to allow, once
again, potentially slow responses by political actors. As pre-
dicted, in democracies, commodity price changes have no
impact at any level of initial Polity2, while in autocracies,
the increase in autocracy following a resource windfall is
larger the higher the initial value of Polity2 (i.e., the less
autocratic the form of government was initially).
The results in columns 1 to 3 are based on OLS esti-
mation. Because this is a dynamic panel model with fixed
effects, there arises a natural concern with Nickell bias.24
To address this concern, in column 4 we show results using
22 It can be easily checked that this is equivalent to including the price
change by itself and then an interaction between the price change and,
say, a democracy dummy. Our specification makes the interpretation of the
coefficients even more straightforward.
23 Notice that by interacting the price shock with the four-year lag of
Polity2 level, ΔPra is no longer capturing the average effect in autocracy
but, rather, the effect in the average autocracy.
24 The fixed-effects OLS specification transforms the data in deviations
from the group mean, producing a mechanical correlation between the trans-
formed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term (Nickell,
1981; Bond, 2002).
system-GMM estimation (Blundell & Bond, 1998).25 The
system-GMM results are very close to the original OLS.
Tests for first- and second-order autocorrelation in the coef-
ficients hint at a proper specification. While we continue to
present both OLS and system-GMM results throughout the
paper, our discussion emphasizes the OLS coefficients.26
Our main results are illustrated in figure 2, which plots the
estimated effect of a change in the price of the principal com-
modity on the change in Polity2, conditional on the initial
level of Polity2, together with 90% confidence bands. In the
top panel, we have the average (unconditional) effect, which
is negative but insignificant. In the middle panel, we have
average effects in democracies and autocracies separately.
The effect is negative in autocracies and nil in democra-
cies. In the bottom panel, we plot the response conditional
on inframarginal differences in contestability. The increase
in autocracies is more severe the milder the initial level of
autocracy.
The estimated coefficients imply that the impact of
resource windfalls for a weak autocracy (say, at Polity2 level
−2) is more than twice as large as the one for a more consol-
idated autocracy at Polity2 level −6. In the weak autocracy,
the long-run effect of resource windfalls implies that a 10%
increase in the price of the principal commodity reduces the
Polity2 score by 1.65 points, or 8% of the domain of Polity2
(which goes from −10 to +10). For the more consolidated
autocracy, the effect of a 10% increase in the price of the
principal commodity reduces the Polity2 score by only 0.8
points. An alternative way to put this is that a weak autoc-
racy like Ecuador (average Polity2 score in autocracy −2)
needs a 24% price shock to move to a more consolidated
form of autocracy, like Nigeria’s (average Polity2 score in
autocracy −6). For Nigeria to experience a similar 4 point
reduction in the Polity scale and become like Saudi Arabia
(average Polity2 score in autocracy −10), the price increase
in the principal commodity should be 50%.
25 System-GMM provides consistent estimates in dynamic panel data
model with fixed effects by taking first differences and instrumenting
the differenced variables with all their available lags in levels and dif-
ferences. Asymptotic results of system-GMM are potentially misleading
when T increases, as the instrument count grows large relative to the
sample size, overfitting the instrumented variables and failing to expunge
their endogenous components. To limit the number of instruments gener-
ated in system-GMM, we follow Beck and Levine (2004) and Calderon,
Chong, and Loayza (2002), by combining instruments through addition
into smaller sets. Collapsing makes the instrument count linear in T ,
while retaining information as no lags are actually dropped (Roodman,
2009a).
26 As can be seen in the subsequent tables system-GMM and OLS results
are typically quite close to each other. This is not surprising given that
the large time dimension of our sample (T = 48) greatly reduces concerns
with Nickell bias in the OLS specification. Indeed, given the structure of our
panel, OLS may well be preferable. As Roodman (2009b) pointed out, “If T
is large, dynamic panel bias becomes insignificant, and a more straightfor-
ward fixed-effects estimator works. Meanwhile, the number of instruments
in difference and system-GMM tends to explode with T . If N is small, the
cluster–robust standard errors and the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test
may be unreliable.”
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Figure 2.—Marginal Price Effect at Different Initial Levels of Polity
D. Robustness Checks
In this section we report a number of robustness checks
on our results from the previous subsection. In particular, we
discuss robustness to (a) breaking down the Polity2 score in
its components; (b) using alternative criteria for inclusion in
the sample based on importance of the principal commodity
in the economy; (c) focusing on observations away from the
lower and upper bounds of Polity2; (d) dropping large com-
modity producers with the potential of influencing the world
price; (e) measuring resource-rent shocks based on a basket
of commodities rather than only the principal commodity;
and (f) breaking down commodities by type (mineral versus
nonmineral; point source versus diffuse).27
The Polity2 score is a summary measure of three sets of
indicators describing constraints on the executive, openness
and competitiveness of the recruitment process into the exec-
utive, and political competition. All three sets of outcomes
27 In the online appendix we report further checks based on accuracy of
the identification of the principal commodity, alternative ways to treat prob-
lematic values of Polity2, alternative timing structures for the relationship
between outcomes and shocks; alternative thresholds for democracy, and
alternative measures of the outcome variable.
are plausible proxies for B. A turn toward a more autocratic
stance will result in fewer constraints on the actions and
recruitment process of the executive power and, by defini-
tion, less political competition. Hence, our first robustness
check is to see whether resource windfalls affect all three
subcomponents of Polity2. The results are reported in table 4.
The results are in line with those obtained on the overall
Polity2 variable: there exists a negative and significant rela-
tion, in autocracies only, between commodity windfalls and
the change in all three different components of institutional
quality. The impact among autocracies is heterogeneous and
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level for the
three Polity2 sub-scores. Given these results, in the rest of
the paper we stick to the overall Polity2 score.
Table 5 checks the robustness of our results to the exclu-
sion of countries whose principal commodity accounts for
only a small share of GDP. For these countries it is unlikely
that a price change represents a large windfall, so focusing on
a smaller sample with significant principal-commodity share
is arguably a better test for our model.28 Columns 1 and 2
exclude countries in the first decile of the average share dis-
tribution (14 countries, typically modern democracies with a
diversified economy), columns 3 and 4 exclude countries in
the first quartile (33 countries), and columns 5 and 6 exclude
all countries below the median average share (66 countries).
Results from baseline sample are confirmed and generally
reinforced as we progressively increase the threshold to be
included in the sample. In particular the point estimates for
the average autocracy become more negative as we focus
on more commodity-dependent countries. Also the lagged
level of Polity2 interacted with the (autocracy-specific) price
change remains negative and significant throughout all sub-
samples, confirming the heterogeneous impact of resource
windfalls within autocracies.
A related concern is that the interaction between the level
of autocracy and the price of the principal commodity may
proxy for the interaction between the share of the principal
commodity in the economy and its price. This would be true
if countries for which the principal commodity accounts for
a large share of GDP tend to be more autocratic, which is
indeed roughly what our model predicts. If this was true,
then the coefficient on the interaction term may simply be
saying that large resource-rent shocks lead to increases in
autocracy while small ones do not. To address this concern
in the last two columns of table 5, we add a control for the
share of the principal commodity in GDP. Admittedly this
procedure is a bit dubious econometrically, as the share in
GDP of the principal commodity is almost certainly endoge-
nous. Nevertheless, it does serve as a rough-and-ready check
on the hypothesis that the Polity interaction simply proxies
28 However, this benefit should be weighed against the fact that the size
of the commodity sector is endogenous. Hence, this exercise reintroduces
through the back door of sample selection the endogeneity issues we sought
to avoid by focusing on price changes. This is why the exercise is a
robustness check. Our preferred approach remains the one in the previous
section.
RESOURCE WINDFALLS, POLITICAL REGIMES, AND POLITICAL STABILITY 585
Table 4.—Components of Polity2
ΔExconst ΔExrec ΔPolcomp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM
ΔPra −0.10 −0.10 −0.18∗∗ −0.17∗ −0.09 −0.09
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13)
ΔPrd 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.03
(0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12)
ΔPra × Plt−4,a −0.04∗∗ −0.05∗∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.09∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
ΔPrd × Plt−4,d 0.00 −0.03 0.02 −0.02 0.01 −0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Plt−4,a −0.02∗ −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.04∗∗∗ −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Plt−4,d −0.05∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗ −0.02∗ −0.01 −0.06∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Demt−4 −0.42∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.11) (0.04) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) [0.776] [0.629] [0.695]
Number of countries 131 131 131 131 131 131
Observations 4,745 4,745 4,745 4,745 4,745 4,745
Significantly different from 0 at *90%, **95%, ***99%. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the t − 1 to t change in the Polity IV subscore of constraints on the executive (Exconst), whose range is [1, 7].
In columns 3 and 4 is the t − 1 to t change in the Polity IV subscore of contraints on the executive recruitment (Exrec), whose range is [1, 8]. In columns 5 and 6 is the t − 1 to t change in the Polity IV subscore of
political competition (Polcomp), whose range is [1, 10]. ΔPra is the average three-year change in the price of the principal commodity, multiplied by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is autocratic at t − 4.
Plt−4,a is the country’s Polity2 score at t − 4, minus the average score among autocracies at t − 4. ΔPrd and Plt−4,d are the corresponding definitions for democracies. Demt−4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
country is democratic at t − 4. The method of estimation in columns 1, 3, and 5 is least squares and in columns 2, 4, and 6 system-GMM (Blundell-Bond). Standard errors in parenthesis are Huber robust and clustered
at the country level. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first- and second-order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations.
Table 5.—Account for Export Share
Excluding Countries in Excluding Countries in Excluding Countries Control for
the First Decile the First Quartile Below the Median Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM
ΔPra −0.41∗∗ −0.46 −0.41∗ −0.51∗ −0.58∗∗ −0.80∗∗ −0.38∗ −0.64∗
(0.20) (0.28) (0.21) (0.30) (0.26) (0.38) (0.21) (0.34)
ΔPrd 0.31∗ 0.29 0.34∗ 0.31 0.42 0.31 0.23 0.10
(0.18) (0.25) (0.20) (0.29) (0.31) (0.35) (0.19) (0.24)
ΔPra × Plt−4,a −0.13∗∗ −0.18∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗ −0.17∗∗ −0.17∗∗ −0.25∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)
ΔPrd × Plt−4,d 0.04 −0.08 0.05 −0.08 −0.08 −0.25∗ 0.03 −0.05
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.06) (0.07)
Plt−4,a −0.08∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.07∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.07∗∗ −0.07 −0.05∗ 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06)
Plt−4,d −0.13∗∗∗ −0.13∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.13∗ −0.07 −0.10 −0.12∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07)
Share −0.06 −1.62∗
(0.43) (0.98)
Demt−4 −1.39∗∗∗ −0.99∗∗∗ −1.39∗∗∗ −0.87∗∗∗ −1.31∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗∗ −1.32∗∗∗ −0.89∗∗
(0.15) (0.31) (0.16) (0.32) (0.18) (0.31) (0.19) (0.38)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) [0.119] [0.071] [0.553] [0.628]
Number of countries 117 117 98 98 65 65 131 131
Observations 4,217 4,217 3,593 3,593 2,399 2,399 3,599 3,599
Significantly different from 0 at *90%, **95%, ***99%. The dependent variable is the t − 1 to t change in the revised Polity score (Polity2). ΔPra is the average three-year change in the price of the principal
commodity, multiplied by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is autocratic at t − 4. Plt−4,a is the country’s Polity2 score at t − 4, minus the average score among autocracies at t − 4. ΔPrd and Plt−4,d are the
corresponding definitions for democracies. Demt−4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is democratic at t −4. Columns 1 and 2 exclude countries in the first decile of average share for the principal commodity.
Columns 3 and 4 exclude countries in the first quartile of average share for the principal commodity. Columns 5 and 6 exclude countries below the median of average share for the principal commodity. Columns 7 and
8 control for the export share level. The method of estimation in columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 is least squares, in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 system-GMM (Blundell-Bond). Standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust and
clustered at the country level. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first- and second-order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations.
for the share of the principal commodity in GDP. As can be
seen, whether estimated by least squares or by system GMM,
principal commodity price increases reduce democracy, at
decreasing rates, in autocracies only, even after controlling
for the share of the principal commodity in GDP. Because
of the endogeneity of the principal-commodity share, in all
other robustness checks we return to the specification that
omits this variable.
586 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Table 6.—Boundedness of Polity2 Score
ΔPl ≥ 0 D = 1 |ΔPl ≥ 0 Unbounded Countries Unbounded Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM
ΔPra −0.45∗∗ −0.72∗∗ −0.05 −0.06 −0.39∗ −0.48 −0.41∗ −0.44
(0.17) (0.35) (0.03) (0.04) (0.23) (0.32) (0.21) (0.30)
ΔPrd −0.01 −0.27 −0.01 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.05
(0.12) (0.21) (0.03) (0.03) (0.29) (0.36) (0.26) (0.32)
ΔPra × Plt−4,a −0.16∗∗∗ −0.13 −0.03∗∗ −0.04∗∗ −0.13 −0.20∗∗ −0.14∗ −0.18∗∗
(0.05) (0.14) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
ΔPrd × Plt−4,d 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.07 −0.02 0.03 −0.07
(0.04) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12)
Plt−4,a −0.01 0.06 −0.00 0.00 −0.08∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.08∗∗∗ −0.03
(0.02) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Plt−4,d −0.07∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.15∗∗∗ −0.12 −0.13∗∗∗ −0.09
(0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07)
Demt−4 −0.85∗∗∗ −0.41 −0.13∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −1.25∗∗∗ −0.84∗∗∗ −1.26∗∗∗ −0.74∗∗
(0.12) (0.25) (0.02) (0.03) (0.14) (0.29) (0.13) (0.33)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) [0.010] [0.001] [0.238] [0.814]
Number of countries 131 131 131 131 90 90 107 107
Observations 4,593 4,593 4,745 4,745 3,223 3,223 3,635 3,635
Significantly different from 0 at *90%, **95%, ***99%. The dependent variable is the t − 1 to t change in the revised Polity score (Polity2). ΔPra is the average three-year change in the price of the principal
commodity, multiplied by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is autocratic at t − 4. Plt−4,a is the country’s Polity2 score at t − 4, minus the average score among autocracies at t − 4. ΔPrd and Plt−4,d are
the corresponding definitions for democracies. Demt−4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is democratic at t − 4. Columns 1 and 2 consider nonnegative Polity2 changes only. Columns 3 and 4 estimate a
dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a positive Polity2 change and 0 otherwise. Columns 5 and 6 restrict the sample to countries that never touched the boundaries at −10 and +10 on the Polity scale. Columns 7 and 8
exclude the observations at −10 and +10. The method of estimation in columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 is least squares, in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 system-GMM (Blundell-Bond). Standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust
and clustered at the country level. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first- and second-order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations.
Table 6 investigates the robustness of our result on the het-
erogeneous impact of resource windfalls within autocracies.
One potential concern is that such heterogeneity might be
driven by the boundedness of the Polity scale. The argu-
ment is that observations at the −10 boundary are more
constrained in their movements than nonboundary obser-
vations. In particular, as they can not go lower than −10,
price increases would not result in institutional changes. We
address this concern in a number of ways. In columns 1 and
2, we restrict the sample to nonnegative Polity2 changes,
so that countries at the −10 boundary are unconstrained
in their movements. We still find a negative and signifi-
cant heterogeneous effect among autocracies. In columns 3
and 4, we perform a similar exercise but replace the Polity2
change by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if we
observe a positive change and 0 otherwise. This weighs all
institutional changes equally. The heterogeneous impact of
price variation is also maintained under this specification.
Columns 5 and 6 restrict the sample to all countries that
never touched the [−10, +10] boundaries. This is the sam-
ple of countries that had effective free movements in both
positive and negative directions. Also in this case, we find
a negative and significant effect among autocracies. Finally,
in columns 7 and 8, we exclude all country-year observa-
tions at the [−10, 10] boundaries. Limiting the sample to
the unbounded cases provides consistent estimates for cen-
sored regressors (Rigobon & Stoker, 2007, 2009). The results
again confirm the heterogeneity among autocracies.
In a further effort to probe the role of observations at the
−10 boundary, we estimate the heterogeneous effect of price
changes nonparametrically. We divide all observations into
six bins, depending on the value of Polity2, and reestimate
the relationship between changes in Polity2 and changes in
principal commodity prices separately for each of these bins
(always including country and year fixed effects). The six
bins are for Polity2 values [−10,−8], [−7,−6], [−5,0], [1,5],
[6,7], and [8,10], respectively. These bin sizes were chosen
to have as uniform as possible a sample size across bins,
while at the same time preserving symmetry between “auto-
cratic” and “democratic” bins. The estimated coefficients and
the relative confidence bands (at the 90% level) are plotted
against the average value of Polity2 in each bin in figure 3.
The figure shows that even in the second bin from the bottom,
the effect of price changes is considerably weaker than in the
third bin. This is important because for observations in this
bin, the lower bound at −10 does not appear ever to be bind-
ing. To check this, we have calculated, for each initial value
of the Polity2 variable on the right-hand side of our main
regression, the fraction of (strictly) negative policy changes
equal to the distance from the lower bound, on the left-hand
side. For example, for observations at Polity2 = −7, we
computed the fraction of changes equal to −3. The results,
reported in table A10 in the online appendix (together with
the analogous numbers for positive changes), show that the
lower bound at −10 is never binding for changes in any of
the five bins other than the bottom bin.
In table 7 we address the plausible concern that current
commodity prices are affected by expectations of future
political developments in the main world producers. We
therefore exclude from the sample all countries belonging to
OPEC (columns 1 and 2) and those accounting for more than
3% of total world production of their principal commodity
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Figure 3.—Estimated Coefﬁcient at Different Bins
(columns 3 and 4).29 Despite the significant drop in sample
size, in our key specifications, the results on the heteroge-
neous impact among autocracies remain robust at least at the
10% significance level.
Our source of identification for resource windfalls stems
from variations in the international price of the principal
commodity. Other authors in this field (Deaton, 1999; Brück-
ner & Ciccone, 2010; Besley & Persson, 2011) instead use
a country-specific composite price index, weighting com-
modity prices by each commodity’s share in the country’s
total exports. We have not followed this strategy because
of concerns with the possible endogeneity of commodity
shares (as well as measurement error). However, in table 8
we check the robustness of our results to this alternative
specification, constructing a country-specific index based on
commodities in our sample. In columns 1 and 2, we weigh
price changes by each country’s time average of the share
of that commodity in exports. Because time coverage of the
share data varies dramatically over time, these averages are
also computed over very different time periods from country
to country. In the other columns, we follow the far superior
practice of using shares in a given year. The downside of
this is that sample sizes shrink significantly, as in each year
there is a sizable subset of countries for which shares are
not observed. In these experiments, the qualitative patterns
of our baseline results are robust, but statistical significance
is not always achieved.
29 We treat Indonesia and Gabon as OPEC countries, as they belonged to
the organization for more than half of the sample period. Instead, we exclude
Angola and Ecuador, which joined the OPEC only in 2007. Alternative
treatments of these countries do not alter the results. A list of the major
producers by principal commodity, as well as data sources for commodity
production, is given in table A2 in the online appendix.
Table 7.—Excluding Big Producers
Exclude OPEC Countries Exclude Big Producers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM
ΔPra −0.43∗∗ −0.36 −0.54∗∗ −0.54
(0.21) (0.28) (0.24) (0.33)
ΔPrd 0.10 0.02 −0.03 −0.24
(0.19) (0.25) (0.25) (0.36)
ΔPra × Plt−4,a −0.15∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.15∗ −0.23∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
ΔPrd × Plt−4,d 0.04 −0.00 0.07 0.03
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11)
Plt−4,a −0.07∗∗ −0.03 −0.08∗∗∗ −0.06
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Plt−4,d −0.12∗∗∗ −0.12∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.11
(0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10)
Demt−4 −1.31∗∗∗ −1.00∗∗∗ −1.42∗∗∗ −1.27∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.32) (0.18) (0.43)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) [0.750] [0.770]
Number of countries 120 120 87 87
Observations 4,283 4,283 3,004 3,004
Significantly different from 0 at *90%, **95%, ***99%. The dependent variable is the t − 1 to t change
in the revised Polity score (Polity2). ΔPra is the average three-year change in the price of the principal
commodity, multiplied by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is autocratic at t − 4. Plt−4,a is the
country’s Polity2 score at t − 4, minus the average score among autocracies at t − 4. ΔPrd and Plt−4,d
are the corresponding definitions for democracies. Demt−4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country
is democratic at t − 4. Columns 1 and 2 exclude OPEC countries. Columns 3 and 4 exclude countries
producing more than 3% of total world production in their principal commodity. Details on the sources
used to identify big producers are reported in appendix table A2. The method of estimation in columns 1 and
3 is least squares and in columns 2 and 4, system-GMM (Blundell-Bond). Standard errors in parentheses
are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the
p-values for first- and second-order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations.
In table 9 we deal with the issue of commodity typology.
An important distinction that has been made in the litera-
ture is between point source and diffuse natural commodities
(Sokoloff & Engerman, 2000; Isham et al., 2005). The for-
mer are believed to foster weaker institutional capacity and
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Table 8.—Alternative Commodity Price Index
Average Weight Weight 1975 Weight 1980 Weight 1990 Weight 2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM
ΔPra −0.39 −0.36 −0.49∗ −0.34 −0.46 −0.36 −0.52∗ −0.28 −0.52∗ −0.60∗
(0.25) (0.36) (0.28) (0.40) (0.28) (0.32) (0.30) (0.33) (0.28) (0.35)
ΔPrd 0.20 0.40 0.31 1.03∗ 0.29 0.47 0.09 0.22 0.29 0.73
(0.33) (0.42) (0.38) (0.55) (0.22) (0.33) (0.37) (0.46) (0.34) (0.54)
ΔPra × Plt−4,a −0.10 −0.15 −0.12 −0.19∗ −0.16∗ −0.25∗∗ −0.22∗∗ −0.20∗∗ −0.11 −0.18∗
(0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
ΔPrd × Plt−4,d 0.07 −0.13 0.12 −0.20 −0.01 −0.09 0.01 −0.06 0.08 −0.16
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.20) (0.09) (0.11) (0.15) (0.17) (0.08) (0.14)
Plt−4,a −0.07∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.07∗∗ −0.07 −0.06∗∗ −0.04 −0.03 −0.00 −0.07∗∗∗ −0.06
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Plt−4,d −0.10∗∗∗ −0.11∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.13∗ −0.06 −0.09 −0.06 −0.05 −0.10∗∗∗ −0.12∗
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06)
Demt−4 −1.32∗∗∗ −1.02∗∗∗ −1.43∗∗∗ −1.11∗∗∗ −1.29∗∗∗ −1.04∗∗∗ −1.20∗∗∗ −0.83∗∗∗ −1.32∗∗∗ −1.07∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.27) (0.17) (0.29) (0.14) (0.25) (0.15) (0.30) (0.13) (0.26)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) [0.467] [0.758] [0.016] [0.425] [0.088]
Number of countries 131 131 84 84 82 82 78 78 122 122
Observations 4,962 4,962 3,600 3,600 3,527 3,527 3,327 3,327 4,629 4,629
Significantly different from 0 at *90%, **95%, ***99%. The dependent variable is the t − 1 to t change in the revised Polity score (Polity2). ΔPra is the average three-year change in the price of the principal
commodity, multiplied by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is autocratic at t − 4. Plt−4,a is the country’s Polity2 score at t − 4, minus the average score among autocracies at t − 4. ΔPrd and Plt−4,d are the
corresponding definitions for democracies. Demt−4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is democratic at t − 4. All columns follow the methodology in Deaton and Miller (1995) to construct the weighted
price index of commodities. We use all commodities included in the UN COMTRADE database and whose price series is identified in the IMF IFS database. Columns 1 and 2 weigh commodities by their average
share in country exports, measured over all available years. Columns 3 and 4 weigh commodities by their share in 1975, the base year used in Deaton and Miller (1995). Columns 5 and 6 weigh commodities by their
share in 1980, the base year used in Besley and Persson (2011). Columns 7 and 8 weigh commodities by their share in 1990, the base year used in Deaton (1999) and Brückner and Ciccone (2010). Columns 9 and 10
weigh commodities by their share in 2001, the year with the highest number of reporting countries. The method of estimation in columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 is least squares and in columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 system-GMM
(Blundell-Bond). Standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first- and second-order autocorrelated disturbances in
the first differences equations.
Table 9.—Typologies of Commodities
First Classification Second Classification Third Classification
Point Source Diffuse Mineral Nonmineral Oil Nonoil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM
ΔPra −0.37∗ −0.41 −1.68∗∗ −1.35 −0.22 −0.23 −1.09∗∗∗ −0.66 −0.30∗ −0.36 −0.96∗∗∗ −0.79∗∗
(0.21) (0.29) (0.82) (0.81) (0.29) (0.36) (0.40) (0.44) (0.15) (0.22) (0.29) (0.38)
ΔPrd 0.24 0.22 −0.38 −0.17 0.22 0.20 −0.21 −0.16 0.22 0.31 −0.14 −0.34
(0.22) (0.25) (0.44) (0.60) (0.27) (0.31) (0.33) (0.42) (0.23) (0.28) (0.19) (0.27)
ΔPra × Plt−4,a −0.18∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ 0.34 0.54 −0.12∗∗ −0.12∗ −0.03 −0.04 −0.08 −0.07 −0.08 −0.16
(0.05) (0.07) (0.57) (0.63) (0.05) (0.07) (0.21) (0.24) (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12)
ΔPrd × Plt−4,d 0.02 −0.10 0.14 0.23∗ 0.06 −0.05 −0.01 0.04 −0.04 −0.08 0.04 −0.04
(0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.16) (0.11) (0.13) (0.07) (0.09)
Plt−4,a −0.05∗∗ −0.04 −0.12 −0.10 −0.08∗∗∗ −0.07 −0.05 −0.02 −0.08∗ −0.08 −0.07∗∗ −0.03
(0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.10) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Plt−4,d −0.11∗∗∗ −0.07 −0.12∗∗ −0.17 −0.12∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.11 −0.10 −0.07 −0.13∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.07)
Demt−4 −1.34∗∗∗ −0.64∗ −1.37∗∗∗ −1.38∗∗∗ −1.39∗∗∗ −1.02∗∗∗ −1.31∗∗∗ −1.06∗∗∗ −1.92∗∗∗ −1.70∗∗ −1.37∗∗∗ −1.13∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.34) (0.22) (0.46) (0.20) (0.34) (0.17) (0.39) (0.56) (0.69) (0.13) (0.30)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) [0.973] [0.526] [0.676] [0.683] [0.187] [0.816]
Number of countries 87 87 44 44 70 70 61 61 30 30 101 101
Observations 3,127 3,127 1,618 1,618 2,494 2,494 2,251 2,251 1,152 1,152 3,593 3,593
Significantly different from 0 at *90%, **95%, ***99%. The dependent variable is the t − 1 to t change in the revised Polity score (Polity2). ΔPra is the average three-year change in the price of the principal
commodity, multiplied by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is autocratic at t − 4. Plt−4,a is the country’s Polity2 score at t − 4, minus the average score among autocracies at t − 4. ΔPrd and Plt−4,d are the
corresponding definitions for democracies. Demt−4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is democratic at t − 4. Mineral commodities are aluminium, bauxite, coal, copper, gemstones, gold, natural gas, oil, pig
iron, phosphates, silver, tin, and uranium. Nonmineral commodities are bananas, beef meat, cocoa, coffee, cotton, fish, groundnuts, jute, maize, oranges, rice, rubber, soybean, sugar, swine meat, tea, tobacco, wheat,
and wood. The point source/diffuse distinction follows almost the same classification, but assigns countries producing bananas, cocoa, coffee, and sugar to the other category. The method of estimation in columns 1,
3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 is least squares and in columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12, system-GMM (Blundell-Bond). Standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. The values reported for AR(1)
and AR(2) are the p-values for first- and second-order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations.
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induce greater resistance to democratic reforms than the
latter, as they are generally more valuable and easier to con-
trol for the ruling elite. We therefore expect our theory to
apply more strictly to countries whose principal commodity
is point source. We take as point source all mineral commodi-
ties plus coffee, cocoa, sugar, and bananas—agricultural
commodities identified as point source in Sokoloff and
Engerman (2000) and Isham et al. (2005). Our data show that
point source producers are indeed more autocratic (average
Polity2 level −0.36) than countries with diffuse principal
commodities (average Polity2 level 3.57). A mean compar-
ison test rejects the null hypothesis of means equality at
the 99% confidence level (t-stat 17.56). Columns 1 and 2
in table 9 confirm our baseline results for the sample of
point source producers: the impact of resource windfalls is
negative and heterogeneous within autocracies, while it has
no effect in democracies. Columns 3 and 4 show instead
an average significant effect for diffuse commodity produc-
ers, but no significant heterogeneity. In columns 5 to 8, we
consider an alternative classification, taking as point source
commodities minerals only. Columns 5 and 6 confirm the
results for mineral autocratic countries. Columns 7 and 8
consider nonmineral countries only and display a negative
average relation between price and institutional change, with
no evidence of heterogeneity in the effect. In the last set
of columns, we tried to check whether the difference in
results between point source/mineral and diffuse/nonmineral
is driven by oil. Unfortunately, the oil sample becomes too
small for significant results, but the similarity of coefficients
suggests that oil is not the only mineral driving the hetero-
geneous effect of resource booms in autocracies. Altogether,
table 9 provides support for our theory in point source pro-
ducers under both alternative classifications, while it is less
conclusive for diffuse commodities producers.30
The final robustness check we performed was on the sen-
sitivity of our results to possible outliers. We reran our
specifications excluding all the observations in the top 1%
of the distribution of price changes (in absolute value) or
in the top 1% of the distribution of Polity2 changes. We
also excluded all influential observations, as identified by
the DFBETA method, once again without changes in results.
These results are available on request.
IV. Conclusion
We have presented a model of endogenous political
regime determination as a function of natural resource rents.
The model predicts that, everything else equal, resource-
poor countries will be more likely to be democracies than
resource-rich ones. This is a notoriously difficult prediction
to test. Hence, we use the model to develop an additional
testable implication that, we argue, better leads itself to
30 In a related finding, Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) report that the prob-
ability of leadership change decreases following windfalls in the form of
oil and lootable diamonds, while it increases following mineral windfalls.
causal identification. This prediction is that among autoc-
racies, resource windfalls will trigger further moves toward
harsher forms of autocracy, the more so the less entrenched
the autocracy was initially, while there is no impact in coun-
tries that start out as democracies. These predictions find
empirical support in a broad panel of countries.
Future work could usefully look at other outcomes. We
have briefly discussed the possibility of extending the model
to deliver predictions on uses of the resource rents other
than to distort the political rules of the game in the incum-
bent’s favor, such as spending on education or infrastructure.
This could be extended to generate predictions on the
growth response of the economy to resource windfalls. It
seems likely that such extensions will produce similar non-
monotonicities in the relation between resource windfalls
and outcomes, as we found in this paper, and that such
predictions could be tested using a similar conditioning
strategy.
The nonmonotonicities we uncover, both theoretical and
empirical, imply a more nuanced policy response to nat-
ural resource windfalls than has generally been the case
heretofore. While our empirical work focuses on local
changes in resource rents, the model predicts that a large dis-
crete resource windfall has the capacity to tip a democracy
into autocracy. Countries close to the democracy-autocracy
threshold are therefore more vulnerable to the impact of
large resource discoveries and should be the focus of height-
ened attention from policymakers in importing countries and
extractive industries alike.
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